Episode 34 — Authentication and MFA for i1
Phishing-resistant authentication methods deserve priority because attackers increasingly target users rather than systems. Phishing resistance means that even if a user clicks a malicious link, they cannot be tricked into approving access for an attacker. Examples include hardware-based security keys following standards like FIDO2, or platform authenticators that tie cryptographic credentials to the user’s device. Push-based prompts are better than passwords but still vulnerable if users approve requests reflexively. SMS codes offer limited protection because they can be intercepted or spoofed. As organizations mature, they should shift toward methods that cannot be replayed or proxied. For i1, demonstrating that the most sensitive accounts use phishing-resistant factors shows measurable progress toward a resilient identity posture.
MFA coverage for critical systems is the evidence reviewers look for first. At the i1 level, all administrative, remote, and high-impact systems must enforce MFA at every entry point. This includes cloud dashboards, remote management interfaces, and any tool with access to sensitive data. Non-critical internal systems should still have MFA when feasible, but the focus is on protecting access that could lead to widespread compromise. The requirement is not that every login be equal, but that the riskiest logins always have an extra gate. A coverage matrix listing systems, user groups, and MFA status helps visualize where protections exist and where gaps remain. Complete coverage for privileged and external access is the standard that distinguishes i1 from essential hygiene.
Authenticator types generally fall into three families: apps, tokens, and biometrics. App-based authenticators, such as those using time-based one-time passwords, are popular because they cost little and integrate widely. Hardware tokens provide tamper-resistant keys and work well for high-assurance roles like system administrators. Biometric factors—fingerprint, face, or voice recognition—add convenience but must operate within secure devices and meet privacy standards. Each type has different recovery and management needs. The best practice is diversity: choose more than one supported factor so users have alternatives when one fails. Assure that backup methods are as strong as the primary; weaker recovery paths often undermine the entire control. For assurance, the key is that the chosen methods are documented, enforced, and tested regularly.
Session management and reauthentication windows ensure that authentication remains valid only for as long as necessary. Users should not stay authenticated indefinitely; sessions need reasonable timeouts, especially for sensitive applications. Reauthentication should occur when users escalate privileges, access critical data, or return after extended inactivity. Idle session limits reduce risk from unattended devices, while reauthentication windows balance security with usability. Systems should log session events and enforce consistent policies across platforms. The goal is to maintain continuous assurance that the logged-in user is still the authorized one. Short, clear configurations and reliable timeouts demonstrate both intent and execution in control evidence.
Service and automation accounts deserve explicit attention because they often bypass interactive authentication altogether. Even though these accounts cannot use standard MFA, they must have compensating controls such as strong, rotated credentials, and restricted scopes. Credential management systems should store secrets securely and log every use. Default or shared accounts should be eliminated or converted to managed identities wherever possible. i1 expects that organizations know where these accounts exist, who owns them, and how their use is monitored. Service accounts should never become invisible parts of the environment. For assurance, clear documentation and sample credential audits prove that automation is managed, not uncontrolled.
Legacy protocols and exception handling often reveal the true maturity of an MFA program. Some older systems do not support modern authentication methods, but they still need to be protected through gateways, compensating controls, or phased replacement. All exceptions must be documented with reasons, risk analysis, and planned end dates. This shows reviewers that gaps are known and managed, not ignored. Whenever legacy systems remain in use, network segmentation, strict logging, and compensating access reviews can reduce risk. The difference between a temporary exception and a weakness is documentation and follow-through. In i1, maturity is measured not by perfection but by honesty and progress.
Evidence for authentication and MFA should include exports, screenshots, and configuration policies that prove enforcement. Screenshots must show the system name, timestamp, and relevant settings—such as MFA enabled and applied to required roles. Configuration exports from identity platforms provide the clearest proof of policy coverage. If logs are used, include filters showing successful and failed attempts with timestamps. Policies and procedures should align with what the evidence shows. Reviewers should be able to trace each claim to a visible setting or file. Clear, dated artifacts eliminate ambiguity and keep QA reviews short and predictable. Evidence discipline is as important as control strength.
A consistent and enforced authentication posture is the goal. i1 expects organizations to prove that users, administrators, and automated systems all authenticate in ways proportionate to their risk. MFA must be present, configured, and monitored, with phishing-resistant options prioritized where possible. Exceptions must be few, documented, and temporary. Evidence must be clear, dated, and tied to policies that match real configurations. When authentication works this way, trust is earned instead of assumed, and assurance becomes a reflection of daily discipline rather than a snapshot in time. Strong authentication is not just a control—it is the foundation of digital trust in every assurance program.
